



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Conference on

The EU as a Security/Defence Community?

2 and 3 July 2004

Castle of Schengen, Luxembourg

Introduction

The Iraq War in 2003 and EU Eastern enlargement in 2004, albeit in different ways, have cast a long shadow over the willingness and capacity of the EU to engage in common military interventions for security or defence purposes. Both events have laid bare the "transatlantic rift" at the heart of Europe, the tension between those who seek ever closer ties with Washington and those who favour more European autonomy, perhaps even a strategic partnership with Russia. More fundamentally perhaps, the failure to come to a common position on foreign and security policy matters raises once again the question about the present and future role of the EU in the world. What does the EU stand for? What could – or should – it stand for? What is the finality of the European integration process in the wake of enlargement?

Against this background, the Luxembourg Institute for European and International Studies (LIEIS) held a two-day conference on "The EU as a security/defence community?" on 2 and 3 July 2004 in Schengen. There were approximately 20 participants, both academics and policy-makers from equally many countries, most from EU member states but some also from candidate countries and other European states. In the course of 6 discussion sessions, the debates revolved around the following aspects of European security and defence policy:

- (1) the transformation of the nature of security and defence and the insights and limits of Karl Deutsch's concept of security community



- (2) the need for a fundamental debate on the principles and the finality of the EU
- (3) the recent history of European security and defence, in particular the experience on the Balkans
- (4) the new context within which security and defence are defined
- (5) actual and possible concepts and strategies for a common European security/defence community
- (6) the evolution of US hegemony and the future of EU-USA relations

I. The transformation of the nature of security and defence

In his opening remarks, Armand Clesse, Director of the LIEIS, drew the attention to the increasing discrepancy between the economic and the political dimension of the European integration process. While there has been substantial progress on economic, commercial and financial interdependence and integration, almost everything remains to be done at the level of a common political project. Nor is this a new or recent phenomenon, but goes back as far as the failure to agree on a European Defence Community in 1954, when the French National Assembly rejected such a project. Ever since, the political and strategic dimension of European integration has lagged well behind the economic dimension. It is perhaps this discrepancy which explains why the centrifugal forces within the EU are nowadays outweighing the centripetal forces. How valid, if at all, is it in such a context to speak of the EU as a security or even defence community, in the sense of Karl Deutsch's concept of pluralistic and amalgamated security communities? Or is it more appropriate to think of the EU as a "superpower in the making", in the words of Johan Galtung? More generally, where and what is the EU heading for? Will there be more or less integration in future? Are security and defence part of a successful process of European integration? Should they be? Should the EU actively develop a political and strategic identity? Will such an identity be configured with, without or perhaps even against the USA?

Christopher Coker, Professor for International Relations at the London School for Economics and Political Science, argued that Karl Deutsch's concept of security communities is value-based rather than interest-based and that values translate into norms, i.e. rules of behaviour that structure the action of individuals and institutions. Deutsch had two kinds of security communities in mind – the Coal and Steel Community and NATO – but these have evolved in diametrically opposed directions. Unlike in 1957, at the time when Deutsch was writing, NATO is no longer a security community because it has been instrumentalised to serve certain interests. The EU, which has grown out of the Coal and Steel Community, has remained or become a security community, in the sense that EU institutions embody certain values that translate into norms, which in turn shape the preferences of actors. This marks a shift, albeit imperfect, from an exclusive means-ends relationship to something like social legitimacy.

Secondly, according to Prof. Coker, there are now trans-national states and no longer traditional classic nation-states. The importance of this evolution is the phenomenon of shared sovereignty, the idea that risk is being shared between not only different sectors but also nominally sovereign countries. The sharing of risk has become the norm; the distribution of risk has become the rule. The EU as a trans-national state is an example of this evolution and

therefore to some extent an example of a security community, committed to shared risk and thereby to shared sovereignty. Thirdly, Prof. Coker drew on Karl Deutsch to say that NATO has become an amalgamated community, while the EU is a pluralistic community which differs from the USA regarding weapons systems in a number of important respects, including target policies, cluster bombs and depleted uranium. So contrary to Deutsch, the EU views peace as a process, not as a product. The point is that the evolution of the EU since the 1950s marks the slow transition away from a security community (in Deutsch's sense) towards a risk community.

Prof. Johan Galtung, Director of the network *Transcend*, took a different line. He advocated that peace be substituted for security and that attack be substituted for defence. Both security and defence are but propaganda because security has Hobbesian connotations that are vertically-loaded and imply coercion from the top, while defence stands simply for war. There are five prerequisites for an effective prevention of war:

- (1) interdependence
- (2) equity (symmetry or equal distribution of resources)
- (3) homology (similarity of structures)
- (4) entropy (equal distribution between governments and non-governmental actors)
- (5) superstructure (Karl Deutsch's amalgamated communities)

On the condition that these 5 prerequisites are fulfilled, the internal structure of countries would prevent rather than promote war. The EU stands out as a peace community, but is divided by the question of foreign policy. How will attitudes evolve in Central and Eastern Europe vis-à-vis the USA or Russia? How will the UK position itself? A regression to a large free trade area is unlikely in virtue of the EU's strong internal dynamics. But according to Prof. Galtung, there is a distinct danger that the EU will simulate US imperialism, because 11 out of 15 EU member states (prior to enlargement) were at some point in their history imperial forces. The key to the question about the future course of the EU is whether it can engage not only with its immediate neighbourhood (Turkey, the Ukraine, Russia), but also with the Middle East and the Muslim world at large, as well as with Asia.

For Willem van Eekelen, former Secretary General of the Western European Union, some criticism of recent and present EU initiatives in the realm of foreign and security policy is necessary. But, on the whole, Eastern enlargement has been a success, the transatlantic relations cannot be dismissed, and the EU has a wide spectrum of policies that constitute a great advantage vis-à-vis NATO. There are of course many areas in which the EU needs to take urgent action. First of all, fostering bilateral relations with all countries of the Middle East and closer ties with Russia. Secondly, enhancing military capabilities, including the credible threat of the use of force in order to prevent repetitions of events like in Srebrenica in 1995.

II. The need for a fundamental debate on the principles and on the finality of the EU

According to A. Clesse, this raises the question of whether the EU can invent a different model and also a different kind of power (perhaps "soft" rather than "hard"). J. Galtung insisted on the profound differences that divide Europe and the USA. While in the latter, as many as 71% of the total population believe in Satan, making the USA a pre-modern "civil



religion", Europe is a child of the Enlightenment with a much longer history and different beliefs. Other participants stressed the increasing tensions between the West and the rest of the world, in particular Islam. Prof. András Balogh from the University of Budapest argued that Islamic fundamentalism is essentially a reaction to the Christian crusades of the past and the present. The challenge to the Muslim world is to modernise and thereby to undercut the tendency towards fundamentalism. Prof. Gerhard Ambrosi from the University of Trier took a similar position, saying that the Muslim world had yet to experience something like the Treaty of Westphalia, the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, i.e. freedom from religion. In the absence of modernisation, a continuing and exacerbating "clash of civilisations" between the West and the Muslim countries could no longer be averted.

For Wim van Eekelen, Huntington's thesis of a "clash of civilisation" takes a static approach and fails to consider the dynamic dimension of the encounter of different cultures and religions. Accordingly, fundamentalism is perhaps a reaction to Westernisation but Western culture remains popular in the Muslim world. Moreover, the West also stands for critical thinking and empowering women, which Islam in its present configuration tends to lack.

Prof. Lothar Rühl, former State Secretary at the German Ministry of Defence, contended that the spread of Islam from the 7th century onwards had not been a religion-driven movement but had taken the form of a military conquest aimed not so much at converting infidels but at extending the tax basis of Muslim-dominated countries and at intensifying slave trade. He insisted that there was no fundamental problem with admitting Turkey to the EU but only with a lack of adaptation to life in the West.

Yet others, like Prof. Andre Gunder Frank from the World History Center at the Northeastern University in Boston, disagreed with both positions on account of their Euro- and Western-centrism. Both the USA and Europe are dwarfs in comparison with China, in the past as well as in the future. It is precisely the menacing rise of China which has led to a US encirclement in the Chinese Sea and beyond, in a desperate attempt to thwart the catching-up and overtaking of US hegemonic power. He also asserted that modernisation rests on a fictional reading of history that bears no relation to historical or contemporary reality. Rather than viewing technological progress as modern, the greatest technological innovations in the history of mankind originated in so-called "pre-modern" times in China.

In contrast, Prof. Coker argued that there had not been any history of the Christian crusades in the Arab world prior to the 20th century. This is because at the same point in time, the West itself began to rewrite this history and there was a shift in historiography away from profit-making and conquest towards the spiritual dimension of the crusades, sparking sharp reactions in the Muslim world. So in some sense the West brought to Islam the language of the crusades and, concomitantly, the language of "political religions", which nowadays have all but disappeared in the West, with the exception of the USA. Prof. Coker also argued that the future of Islam is not being determined in the Middle East or Asia alone, but increasingly by Muslims who live in Western countries. The challenge is whether they can produce pluralistic (rather than amalgamated) communities (Karl Deutsch) and how this may change the terms of the debate on fundamentalism vs. Westernisation. Finally, he also said that the terms "pre-modern", "modern" and "post-modern" lack precision and that it is perhaps preferable to speak of more circumscribed phenomena like agency and technological progress. Both mark a different relation with the external environment, a shift away from holistic and dialectical

relations of the so-called "pre-modern" era. On this view, fundamentalism can be seen as a reactionary form of modernity, the willpower to transcend the realm of the material and the mundane.

III. Lessons from the Balkan Wars in the 1990s for the future of the EU as a security/defence community

According to Prof. Galtung, Srebrenica was a function of the Western inability to address the urgent problem of engaging with the Muslim world in non-imperial ways. Prof. Frank blamed the former German Foreign Minister Genscher and the IMF for seeking to destroy Yugoslavia because it was in the narrow interest of the West. Behind these attempts was the US insistence that Yugoslavia repay its debts and the US geo-political and financial interests in this region of the world, in particular securing a pipeline that runs in the valley between Kosovo and Macedonia. The USA also repeatedly torpedoed various peace initiatives. For instance, the 1992 Vance-Owen Plan was essentially the same as the 1995 Dayton agreement, with the difference that the USA undermined the former but backed the latter. Interestingly, at Dayton, the USA was happy to strike a deal with Milosevic, and Kosovo was not mentioned at all.

The arguments advanced by A.G. Frank sparked a heated debate on the origins of the Balkan wars in the 1990s and the lessons for the future of the EU as a security/defence community. Prof. Rühl argued that Yugoslavia was fatally undermined by impossible Serbian demands upon the rest of the federation, namely Slovenia and Croatia, who had been providing substantial net contributions to the federal budget. As early as 1986, the then Yugoslav Defence Minister, a Serbian general, said that it might be necessary to reign in Slovenia and Croatia, even if this required the use of force. Contrary to a commonly held view, the first priority of both the Europeans and the Americans was to safeguard the unity of Yugoslavia. When Slovenia and Croatia proclaimed their independence, neither Bonn (nor Vienna) nor Washington recognised them. Instead, Germany and France (and also Austria) sought a European solution, not least because major German banks had invested several billion DM, underwritten by the German government. The European mistake was to deploy a Wilsonian language of the right of self-determination, rather than a language about the rights to protect and promote "minorities" in a federal state. The European approach was value- and principle-based, not imperial à la Bismarck. The massacre at Srebrenica occurred much later, when the Yugoslav Federation had been lost and when there was terrible inaction on the part of the Europeans.

Prof. Predrag Simic from Belgrade University contended that the Yugoslav crisis was not the product of a series of intelligence errors, but instead a known process that marks the failure of a common European foreign and security policy. First there was the failed mediation by Jacques Delors, because the Third Financial Protocol was not sufficient to resolve the crisis of solvency. Secondly, the civil war was to a large extent the result of a severe dispute between Germany and France about whether to proceed autonomously or in concert with the USA. As late as February 1992, the ongoing crisis could have been averted, when the three presidents of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia signed an agreement. But under the pressure of the US Ambassador, the then Bosnian President Izetbegovic withdrew his signature and provided a pretext for the intervention of the federal army. And so when Slovenia broke away from the

federation unconstitutionally and the Croatian, Bosnian and Serbian agreement fell apart, civil war was all but inevitable.

Prof. Simic also argued that history could well repeat itself in Kosovo. This is because if Kosovo gains independence, then Montenegro is almost certain to relinquish the state union with Serbia. In this light, EU membership of all former Yugoslav countries is crucial in order to provide a peaceful resolution of the different conflicts. The analogy would be Yugoslavia's attempt to join NATO in the 1950s. However, in a repetition of the 1990s, the EU is making similar mistakes by being selective in its dealings with the countries of the region. The Europeans have *de facto* replaced a UN-regime with EU trusteeship, but at the same time overseen the violent displacement of more than 250,000 Serbs who have had to flee Kosovo. And as a result of the enlargement and accession policies, there is now a European "Third World", a number of countries like Serbia which have practically no prospect of joining the EU in the next 15 or 20 years. This contributes to the criminalisation of the political elite and to the exacerbation of ethnic tensions. We are seeing, according to Prof. Simic, a "Columbisation" or "Albanisation" of former Yugoslavia, the emergence of a vast underground economy, coupled with a corrupt political class that risks abandoning most genuine reforms.

So among the lessons from the Yugoslav crises of the 1990s, there are the questions of economic support, irreducible identities and the fatal consequences of the European failure to come to a common position and to implement a common strategy.

IV. A new context for security and defence?

The discussions focused subsequently on some of the aspects related to the new context within which security and defence are defined. Prof. Coker argued that, if anything, "post-modernity" means a lack of engagement, a preference for *ad hoc* coalitions rather than long-term alliances. This phenomenon, which has also been termed "liquid love" by the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman, means that the nature of relations has fundamentally changed, with the effect that relations boil down to empirical management (off-shore capital and short-term mergers). We have also seen the emergence of a risk-society (Ulrich Beck), founded on the lowest common denominator, which is the management ethos, and on quarantine zones to bracket-out dangers (indefinite detention, electronic tagging, etc.). Ultimately, what this leads to is not only the profiling of criminal societies ("axis of evil") and the end of any rehabilitation (crime is no longer seen as a systemic failure but as personal problem), but also the inability to deal with the "weight of history". Not to engage is ultimately to become "bogged down" because there is no "quick exit strategy" and so to manage insecurity, rather than reduce risk. The fundamental problem with "risk-communities" is that there is agreement on what not to do (because action entails risks), but not on what to do (for the same reason). So there can be no rational debate and conclusion on which course of action to take because there is no longer any basis for agreement; all action becomes a subjective judgement call. There is also a total lack of ambition and, as a result, an absence of strategy.

Nicolae Chirtoaca, former Minister of Defence of Moldova, said that there is uncertainty about the nature of war in future. Will it be wars of religion or of ideology? Will there be a move beyond cultural differences towards one civilisation? One constant in the future will be

the persistence of conflicts, threats and risk between different states. This will require a combined response in terms of both security and defence, which at the same time has to be local if it is to make a difference on the ground. In this respect, he also insisted on the absence of any EU strategy vis-à-vis the EU's "near abroad", i.e. the grey-zone of Moldova and the Caucasus. Whereas the USA has a clear strategic vision dictated by the global "war on terror" and offers real guarantees against Russia's post-imperial dreams of creating a large (buffer-)zone of influence, the EU does not seem to realize that most initiatives have *de facto* failed, whether it is the Stabilisation and Accession Partnership on the Balkans, the New Neighbourhood Policy or NATO's Partnership for Peace. The EU is not even able to secure its own borders, let alone the whole wider European space. This is not to say that Europe's geopolitical grey-zone is anti-European and pro-US, it is only to say that the EU has not as much to offer in terms of security and defence as does the USA.

V. Possible Concepts and Strategies for a Common EU Security/Defence Community

Against this background, A. Clesse raised the question of the EU constitutional treaty and wondered whether the EU has reached its limits – geographical, financial, political – or whether there is any realistic scope to attain an ever-closer union. He also wondered whether traditional theories of European integration like (neo-)functionalism and intergovernmentalism are obsolete and whether there has not been a fundamental ambiguity within the EEC, the EC and later the EU on issues of security and defence that goes back to the events of 1954. More fundamentally, the question is what kind of EU is desirable and what kind of EU is feasible, and whether defence is or should be part of the EU, including nuclear deterrence capabilities.

Wim van Eekelen argued that there is widespread reluctance among EU member states to participate in a collective European defence structure because NATO fulfills this function. There seems to be a greater willingness to engage in different forms of solidarity and community such as mutual assistance in the case of terrorist attacks or natural catastrophes. This is consonant with the results of a poll conducted by Euro-Barometer, which reveals that an overwhelming majority of Europeans would like to see a common foreign and security policy. The problem is at the level of national governments and veto-power. Rather than the *status quo*, it is preferable that all those EU member states with the political willingness and the strategic capability go ahead with common initiatives under the "closer cooperation" clause of the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties. The key to any successful EU initiative is to proceed step-by-step, at the level of well-defined missions and to initiate a move away from "identity" (still dominated by the transatlantic alliance) towards something like "policy communities", based on a new conceptual framework and concrete proposals.

Prof. Rühl outlined some concepts for a common EU security/defence community, with reference to the Solana strategy paper of 2003. One of the main points is that structures follow ideas and that therefore new ideas will give rise to new structures. More specifically, there are several possible scenarios. If NATO claims primacy to intervene, then the EU will stand no chance of launching an autonomous operation. However, if the EU can establish something like a "mobile and flexible forward defence force" aimed at rapid interventions, then autonomous EU operations are much more likely to be a feasible alternative to NATO-led interventions. The crux is decision-making, and it is central that the EU moves to Qualified

Majority Voting (QMV), including in this sensitive policy area, which is part of the core sovereign function of any country. The point is that such a move to QMV is possible if there is prior agreement within the EU on what forces are to be deployed for what contingencies. For instance, if anything, history teaches us that any crisis is not static but dynamic and that escalation can be averted on condition of rapid, targeted intervention. Examples of failure to intervene include Biafra and Katanga in the past, and Darfur at the moment. It is thought that between 1,500 and 2,000 adequately trained troops would be sufficient to break up the dynamics that lead to an escalation of an ongoing crisis. In turn, such a rapid intervention force would require a standing force of approximately 50,000 to 60,000, i.e. the Euro-Corps. But the main obstacle is a lack of training and a failure to agree on the conditions that would warrant an intervention. This lack and this failure are compounded by inadequate funding and intelligence.

Prof. Galtung dismissed the Solana analysis, saying that the USA is a major threat to itself, on account of its own blindness and autism. He suggested that only five years ago, the 9/11 attacks were preventable but that the USA was incapable of reading the signs of the time. Prof. Galtung made the following four points:

- (1) if you sow violence, you will reap violence; this well-known phenomenon is described by the CIA as "blow-back"; the obvious step is to scale down your own activities
- (2) exploitation of any kind is always met with resistance, including guerrilla warfare; soaring inequality in the world raises tensions and exacerbates the vicious cycle of violence and repression; the obvious step is to fight poverty and reduce inequality
- (3) there is a discrepancy between the number of states (about 200) and the number of nations (about 2,000); there are only very few nation-states (e.g. Slovenia); federalisation is the only answer, including in centralised nation-states like France; there is no need for intervention from outside, only solutions on the ground are lasting
- (4) there is no "clash of civilisations", but a "clash of regions" within our own civilisation, which we are blind to; there is also an acute need to be able to see conflict from the other side, i.e. try to understand that the Muslim World has been humiliated for a long time.

Prof. Rühl contended that the EU has already redefined defence as a military capability that can be brought to bear on crisis and conflict contingencies in the pursuit of political objectives. The idea of intervening with an expeditionary force marks a new way to think about conventional military action. To be sure, this new approach is selective and does not overcome all the obstacles, but there have been important advances, e.g. the idea to replace combat troops with stabilisation forces in post-conflict scenarios in an attempt not to repeat the same mistakes associated with UN- or EU-led protectorates like on the Balkans. The challenge is to design a robust peace-enforcement and peacekeeping force, capable of integrating local security forces and engaging the local population. The point about the Solana paper is that it provides political guidelines, not profound strategic concepts. What is required is to configure the relation between intervention and stabilisation forces, i.e. to combine European combat troops with something like a European military constabulary and also a civil protection force.

Rather than excluding deterrence, this in turn requires that the EU rethink deterrence, along the following three lines: given that the life-time of weapons is about 25 years and that today the major deterrence capability lies with the USA

- (1) any EU deterrence capability that does not have the support of the USA is bound to fail
- (2) any credible EU deterrence capability must include conventional deterrence, i.e. nuclear deterrence, which is only available to the two European nuclear powers, the UK and France
- (3) any effective EU deterrence capability must encompass unconventional forms of deterrence, including precision-guided missiles to disrupt energy supplies or for targeted killings

All this implies that the two European nuclear powers cooperate and that the EU determines a common enemy, which is not "terrorism" because "terrorism" cannot be fought with military means alone. Instead, the aim of any EU deterrence capability could be to provide credible and effective air defence for the European space, e.g. by stationing forward defence systems in Romania and Turkey. In the absence of such a capability, the EU will be "a house of 450 million people without a roof" or a market of even 500 million with a constitution of the 19th century which will never work in the 21st century.

VI. The evolution of US hegemony and the future of EU-USA relations

In the final discussion session, Prof. Frank made a case for what he described as the possible collapse of the US empire because it ultimately rests on the shaky power of the US \$ and the Pentagon. The point is that US military might depends on the ability to print US \$ at will and to sell them on the world capital markets in order to pull in foreign savings and finance US military campaigns. In other words, the US military presence around the world, whether at the southern flank of Russia, in the Chinese Sea or across Latin America, is the combined result of the FED that prints US \$ and of the Pentagon that lends the US \$ credibility. The empirical evidence is overwhelming:

- (1) global US \$ reserves stand at 4 times the amount of dollars held in the USA
- (2) the US trade deficit is US \$120 billion with Japan, US \$100 billion with China, US \$100 billion with Europe and US \$100 billion with the rest of the world, including Taiwan
- (3) East Asia is the single largest holder of US federal debt
- (4) foreign debt is in excess of 25% of annual US GDP

If all the major oil exporting countries were to price their oil sales in Euros rather than US \$, the US economy would collapse. At the same time, if the UN General Assembly was to set up an "emergency international intervention force" under UN command, it could stop the ongoing violence on the Balkans and in Iraq. The USA is a paper-tiger and the next superpowers will come from Asia, not the West.



There was widespread disagreement with Prof. Frank's account. Wim van Eekelen contended that the economic and financial policies in the USA are indeed dangerous but that the US economy retains the necessary strength to resist any protracted recession, let alone any collapse. Prof. Balogh argued that there are profound differences between Europe, where social cohesion is much higher, and the USA, where inequality threatens social stability. But the depth and scope of the transatlantic economy and the interdependence it implies make any global recession unlikely. It was also said that it is not in anyone's interests that the US economy collapses. If the Euro became the world's reserve currency, it would starve off growth in the Eurozone because of currency appreciation, which would act as a brake on European exports. And if the US \$ sharply depreciated, it would wipe out Asian savings.

Adrian Pabst
LIEIS
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Conference on

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List of participants

- Ambrosi, Gerhard Michael**, Professor, Department of European Economic Policy, University of Trier
- Balogh, András**, former Ambassador; special adviser to the Hungarian Prime Minister; Head of the Department of Modern History, University of Budapest
- Chirtoaca, Nicolae**, Director, European Institute for Political Studies; former Minister of Defense of Moldova, Chisinau
- Clesse, Armand**, Director, Institute for European and International Studies, Luxembourg
- Coker, Christopher**, Professor of International Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science
- van Eekelen, Willem**, former Secretary General of the Western European Union; former Minister of Defense of the Netherlands
- Frank, Andre Gunder**, Professor; Senior Fellow, World History Center, Northeastern University, Boston
- Galtung, Johan**, Professor; Director, Transcend, Geneva
- Hirsch, Mario**, Editor in chief, d'Lëtzebuerger Land, Luxembourg
- Molitor, Edouard**, former Ambassador; Member of the Board of EuroDefense Luxembourg
- Muller, François**, Institut des Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale, Luxembourg
- Muller, Jean-Claude**, Cultural Historian, Premier Conseiller de Gouvernement, Ministry of State, Luxembourg
- Pabst, Adrian**, Researcher, University of Cambridge (UK)
- Rühl, Lothar**, Professor; former State Secretary at the German Ministry of Defense, Cologne
- Simic, Predrag**, Professor, Faculty of Political Sciences, Belgrade University; Director, Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belgrade